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Monday 28 March 2011

High Court - 7, Hinch – Nil; John Hemming MP – 1, Sir Fred Goodwin - Nil

Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4 (10 March 2011)[1]
 
Derryn Hinch, Melbourne talk back radio host (not to be confused with right-wing ranters from Sydney named by Hinch on his website)[2] had his appeal against the conviction of breaching a name suppression order rejected by the High Court which declared that s 42 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic)[3] was within the judicial power of the Victoria State courts, and was not an impermissible burden on Hinch’s implied freedom of political communication – as described by Derryn Hinch ‘High Court - 7, Hinch – Nil.’[4]

The main purpose of the statute is stated as being “to enhance the protection of the community by requiring offenders who have served custodial sentences for certain sexual offences and who are a serious danger to the community to be subject to ongoing supervision while in the community.” The charges under s. 42 of the statute for breaching a name suppression order followed Derryn Hinch naming two alleged serial paedophiles during a rally on the steps of the Parliament House organised to present a petition to the Victoria Parliament as part of ‘Name Them and Shame Them’ campaign; the names were also published on Hinch’s website. The change to the law demanded in the petition was that a judge or magistrate cannot suppress the identity of a serious sex offender unless such identification will also identify a victim.

The power to grant name suppression orders is controversial as there are competing interests, such privacy interests of persons charged or convicted of offences as against the public interests of ‘open justice’ and the public interest in identifying persons charged or convicted with serious offences.
Overlaying these interests are those free speech interests of Derryn Hinch, and other citizens, in seeking changes to laws viewed as being morally wrong.  As to his conviction, and forthcoming sentencing, Derryn Hinch has been around long enough to know what here was doing and appears willing to accept the consequences with equanimity.[5]

The proliferation of statutes that allow name suppression is of general concern - extending beyond the Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic), to Crime Commission statues and terrorism related statutes. Not only are name suppression orders authorised by statute, courts have asserted common law powers to order suppression of names and other information.  Chief Justice French in Hogan v Hinch describes the recognition by Australian common law of a power to prohibit publication of court proceedings such that “there is inherent jurisdiction or implied power in limited circumstances to restrict the publication of proceedings conducted in open court. The exercise of the power must be justified by reference to the necessity of such orders in the interests of the administration of justice. Such an order may be made to and bind the parties, witnesses, counsel, solicitors and, if relevant, jurors and media representatives, or other persons present in court when the order is made, or to whom the order is specifically directed. It is not necessary for present purposes to reach a concluded view on the full extent of the power in relation to the general public.”[6]

We trust in the judiciary have due regard to the public interest of open administration of justice and the freedom of expression of the media and the general public to discuss the administration of justice.  In the United Kingdom the so-called ‘super-injunctions’ are used to gag the media (the injunction orders follow Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191 (HL), which first extended the effect of the orders to “…anyone else with notice of this order).  These super-injunctions are being issued by the U.K. at rate of up to three a month – such that courts may eventually run out of three letter combinations of the alphabet with which to disguise the name of litigants.

While individuals speaking at a rally on the steps of the Parliament House have limited freedom of speech in which to defy judicial orders; there is a class of protestors that have a greater freedom of speech - Parliamentary privilege is included in the 1689 Bill of Rights, which states: "Freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."

In a question to the U.K. House of Commons during a Commons business debate by John Hemming MP on 10 March 2011. Mr Hemming said: “In a secret hearing, Fred Goodwin has obtained a super-injunction preventing him being identified as a banker”; the speech remains available for viewing on YouTube.[7] Sir Fred Goodwin being the former CEO of the Royal Bank of Scotland.
With the open administration of justice, to the extent of publication of decisions of the Queen’s Bench Division online, the relevant decision confirming the grant of the suppression order can be identified;[8]  but not the reason why Sir Fred Goodwin does not want to be identified as a banker when he clearly is a banker.
In 2011 a committee of judges headed by Master of the Rolls Lord Neuberger is to publish the findings of an inquiry into super-injunctions, and the U.K . Government is expected to consider them in a Bill on defamation and libel law.  The report of the inquiry should also be of interest in Australia to the extent it provides guidance as to the exercise of common law judicial powers to grant suppression orders.

Strike two on ISP liability for file sharing in Australia

Roadshow Films Pty Limited v iiNet Limited [2011] FCAFC 23 (24 February 2011)[1]

This is the second strike against Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft (AFACT), which is organising the litigation on behalf of copyright owners in the film production and distribution industry.  The Federal Court decision in 2010 also rejected the claim iiNet had ‘authorised’ the copyright infringements of films by subscribers of the iiNet internet services, in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No. 3) (2010) 263 ALR 215; [2010] FCA 24 (4 February 2010).[2]

The majority decision by the Full Federal Court in February 2011 dismissed the appeal by the copyright holders against iiNet.  The dissenting judgment of Jagot J. held that iiNet had ‘authorised’ the copyright infringements and that evidence from Mr Malone (iiNet's CEO) and another iiNet executive established that iiNet operated with a policy that it would not take any  action on complaints by AFACT.    The policy of iiNet being that it will only disconnect customers if an infringement of copyright is established in court proceedings against a customer; with other Australian ISPs appearing to adopting a similar policy.

AFACT have announced that it will seek the leave of the High Court of Australia.  Leave to appeal is likely to be given because of the important legal and policy implications of the dispute. Although it will take until late 2011 or early 2012 for the appeal to proceed to hearing.

The decision of the High Court will resolve what is the liability of ISPs for the music and film file sharing by their customers under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).  In any event after the decision of the High Court is handed down there is likely to be lobbying of the Federal Parliament to put in place a statutory regime to address the responsibilities of IPS in respect to illegal file sharing by their customers.  

There are existing models of ‘takedown notices’ and ‘three strikes and your are out’ that are in place in other jurisdictions. What is yet to be placed on the negotiating table in Australia is the model being discussed in the United Kingdom in the public consultation as to ‘Online Infringement of Copyright (Initial Obligations) Cost Sharing’, which proposes that the costs of ISPs and the government regulator as regulator are to be split 75:25 between copyright owners and ISPs on the basis of the costs of an ISP which is an “efficient operator” as verified by the online regulator.[3] 

The arguments as to the impact of the Internet on copyright holders’ revenue is a lively debate; the arguments will intensify when the issue is who should carry the costs of protecting the property rights in the films and music files that are being traded on the Internet.