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Showing posts with label name supression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label name supression. Show all posts

Friday, 13 May 2011

Anonymity order by English court refers to Twitter and Facebook

On 12 May 2011 the English Court of Protection referred to Twitter and Facebook in an order made to prevent publication of the name of a person who was the subject of proceedings.   The problem is - Twitter and Facebook are companies operating from the United States and are therefore removed from direct sanction by the English courts.

Kevin Rawlinson, on The Independent newspaper website, reported a Facebook spokesman as commenting that Facebook’s  lawyers were “reviewing” the order and a Twitter spokesman as declining to comment on the order but did note that the Twitter terms of use require users to comply with “all applicable local, state, national, and international laws, rules and regulations”.[1]

The circumstances in which the English court made the order in that an application was made to the U.K. Court of Protection to withdraw all life-sustaining treatment  for a woman  referred to as “M”, who contracted brain stem encephalitis, which had the effect that she is described as a being in a “minimally conscious state”.   The court proceedings followed family members reaching the view that “M” would not wish to continue living in her current state and that it is not in her interests to do so. The Court of Protection has powers to assist those who, for whatever reason, lack the capacity to make decisions themselves. While the court usually conducts proceedings in private, however applications for permission to withdraw nutrition and other cases involving issues of life and death are usually held in open courtMr Justice Baker issued orders, pursuant to rule 92(2) of the Court of Protection Rules 2007,  as to how the proceedings could be reported, with the orders prohibiting “the publishing or broadcasting, in any newspaper, magazine, public computer network, internet site, social network or media including Twitter or Facebook, sound or television broadcast or cable or satellite programme service, of any information (including any photograph) that is likely to lead to the identification” of “M” and other people involved in the application to the court.  Service of the notice was directed to be made:

(1) by service on such newspaper and sound or television broadcasting or cable or satellite or programme services or internet service providers as they think fit, in each case by fax or first class post or e-mail addressed to the editor (in the case of a newspaper) or senior news editor (in the case of a broadcasting or cable or satellite programme service) or website administrator or internet service provider (in the case of an internet service) or the administrator of any social network or media sites and/or to their respective legal departments; and/or
(2) on such other persons as the parties think fit, by personal service.

Members of the Twitterati who defy the court anonymity orders face contempt of court proceedings. What is less certain is the liability of the administrators (one assumes that is intended to describe the managers and operators of the social network sites) in respect of  informing users of the existence of the court order or in respect of the deleting of any post to social networking sites by users that breach the orders; or closing the accounts of users that defy court anonymity orders.

Roy Greenslade, of The Guardian newspaper, noted “that a Twitter spokesman told The Guardian that it does remove "illegal tweets and spam." So it has the technology to do the job.[2] While it is also open to for administrators of any social network sites to close accounts of any person defying court orders that will be as the saying goes - after the horse has bolted.
This court order can be seen as a response the controversy over Twitter accounts being used to name (apparently incorrectly) celebrities that had obtained injunctions that included anonymity orders or orders that prohibited publication that an injunction had been granted (the so-called ‘super-injunction’).   The conflict of interests as between the right to privacy of individuals and freedom of communication of media organisations is discussed in my recent blog on the decision of Mosley v United Kingdom.

Dan Sabbagh, on The Guardian newspaper blog, in considering the potential liability of Twitter and Facebook for content posted by users, refers to the 2009 decision in Metropolitan International Schools v Designtechnica and Google, in which Mr Justice Eady commented that [o]bviously Google has no control over the search terms entered by users of the search engine or of the material which is placed on the web by its users.[3]  Dan Sabbagh summarised the conclusion as to the liability of Google as being it “could not be held liable when it came to defamation because it had not published the material that appeared on its website.[4]  Search engines operate with search algorithms that automatically produce results.  That case can be argued as not providing a close analogy to the situation facing Twitter and Facebook in that social media websites are publishing media rather than technologies that search for information published elsewhere on the web. 

The question is what is the responsibility of the operator of the social media technology for information posted by account holders?  The purpose of a court order directing anonymity of a person is exposed to the risk that a posting on Twitter and Facebook can be automatically posted elsewhere on those sites, with the possibility of the posts being further linked to other sites including blogs.

To the extent that defamation law may provide assistance in determining the liability of social media sites, the common law defence of innocent dissemination suggest that a social media site should be responsible for content posted by account holders, that is until notice is given of the existence of the defamatory material, whereupon a duty to remove the material will exist.[5]
However the enforcement issue remains, Twitter or Facebook may choose to voluntarily comply with court orders made in ‘foreign’ jurisdictions; otherwise those who seek the protection of anonymity orders face the loss of protection of anonymity orders due to the viral spread of the information on social networking sites.


[1] Kevin Rawlinson, Social networking sites consider UK court ruling (13 May 2011) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/online/social-networking-sites-consider-uk-court-ruling-2283766.html

[2] Roy Greenslade, Can Twitter gag tweeters without giving the game away? (9 May 2011) http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2011/may/09/medialaw-twitter

[5] Morris Averill, Defamation – The Internet & the World-Wide Web, (Internet Law Anthology) Prospect Publishing (1997).  In the United Kingdom the ‘innocent dissemination’ defence has been “superseded” by s.1 of the Defamation Act 1996 (UK).

Monday, 28 March 2011

High Court - 7, Hinch – Nil; John Hemming MP – 1, Sir Fred Goodwin - Nil

Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4 (10 March 2011)[1]
 
Derryn Hinch, Melbourne talk back radio host (not to be confused with right-wing ranters from Sydney named by Hinch on his website)[2] had his appeal against the conviction of breaching a name suppression order rejected by the High Court which declared that s 42 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic)[3] was within the judicial power of the Victoria State courts, and was not an impermissible burden on Hinch’s implied freedom of political communication – as described by Derryn Hinch ‘High Court - 7, Hinch – Nil.’[4]

The main purpose of the statute is stated as being “to enhance the protection of the community by requiring offenders who have served custodial sentences for certain sexual offences and who are a serious danger to the community to be subject to ongoing supervision while in the community.” The charges under s. 42 of the statute for breaching a name suppression order followed Derryn Hinch naming two alleged serial paedophiles during a rally on the steps of the Parliament House organised to present a petition to the Victoria Parliament as part of ‘Name Them and Shame Them’ campaign; the names were also published on Hinch’s website. The change to the law demanded in the petition was that a judge or magistrate cannot suppress the identity of a serious sex offender unless such identification will also identify a victim.

The power to grant name suppression orders is controversial as there are competing interests, such privacy interests of persons charged or convicted of offences as against the public interests of ‘open justice’ and the public interest in identifying persons charged or convicted with serious offences.
Overlaying these interests are those free speech interests of Derryn Hinch, and other citizens, in seeking changes to laws viewed as being morally wrong.  As to his conviction, and forthcoming sentencing, Derryn Hinch has been around long enough to know what here was doing and appears willing to accept the consequences with equanimity.[5]

The proliferation of statutes that allow name suppression is of general concern - extending beyond the Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic), to Crime Commission statues and terrorism related statutes. Not only are name suppression orders authorised by statute, courts have asserted common law powers to order suppression of names and other information.  Chief Justice French in Hogan v Hinch describes the recognition by Australian common law of a power to prohibit publication of court proceedings such that “there is inherent jurisdiction or implied power in limited circumstances to restrict the publication of proceedings conducted in open court. The exercise of the power must be justified by reference to the necessity of such orders in the interests of the administration of justice. Such an order may be made to and bind the parties, witnesses, counsel, solicitors and, if relevant, jurors and media representatives, or other persons present in court when the order is made, or to whom the order is specifically directed. It is not necessary for present purposes to reach a concluded view on the full extent of the power in relation to the general public.”[6]

We trust in the judiciary have due regard to the public interest of open administration of justice and the freedom of expression of the media and the general public to discuss the administration of justice.  In the United Kingdom the so-called ‘super-injunctions’ are used to gag the media (the injunction orders follow Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191 (HL), which first extended the effect of the orders to “…anyone else with notice of this order).  These super-injunctions are being issued by the U.K. at rate of up to three a month – such that courts may eventually run out of three letter combinations of the alphabet with which to disguise the name of litigants.

While individuals speaking at a rally on the steps of the Parliament House have limited freedom of speech in which to defy judicial orders; there is a class of protestors that have a greater freedom of speech - Parliamentary privilege is included in the 1689 Bill of Rights, which states: "Freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."

In a question to the U.K. House of Commons during a Commons business debate by John Hemming MP on 10 March 2011. Mr Hemming said: “In a secret hearing, Fred Goodwin has obtained a super-injunction preventing him being identified as a banker”; the speech remains available for viewing on YouTube.[7] Sir Fred Goodwin being the former CEO of the Royal Bank of Scotland.
With the open administration of justice, to the extent of publication of decisions of the Queen’s Bench Division online, the relevant decision confirming the grant of the suppression order can be identified;[8]  but not the reason why Sir Fred Goodwin does not want to be identified as a banker when he clearly is a banker.
In 2011 a committee of judges headed by Master of the Rolls Lord Neuberger is to publish the findings of an inquiry into super-injunctions, and the U.K . Government is expected to consider them in a Bill on defamation and libel law.  The report of the inquiry should also be of interest in Australia to the extent it provides guidance as to the exercise of common law judicial powers to grant suppression orders.